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The Practice of Online-Targeted Advertising

A. Introduction
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has sanctioned more than a
dozen companies during the past two years for privacy violations involving
the improper installation of spyware software on personal computers.1 The
spyware software allowed companies to watch and control a consumer's
online activities, either without the consumer's knowledge or with the
consumer's knowledge but without reasonable means for the consumer to
stop it. 2 The practice of online-targeted advertising raises similar privacy

issues as the use of spyware software because it also involves behind-thescenes tracking, which most consumers never notice. 3 Online-targeted
advertising allows marketing companies to engage in the same behavior as

companies who use spyware-watching the consumer's Internet actions,
often without the consumer's knowledge or with the consumer's knowledge
but without meaningful consent or without offering the consumer the ability

1. See infra Part V.
2. See generally, Dave Coustan, How Spyware Works, How STUFF WORKS,
http://computer. howstuffworks.com/spyware.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
3. Louise Story, F.T.C. Member Vows Tighter Controls of Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/technology/02adco.html?_r1l&oref
=slogin.
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to stop it. 4 Nonetheless, the FTC has not brought a single action against a
company that engages in improper online-targeted advertising.
The FTC's inaction highlights the need for legislative action and
appropriations that spur the FTC to crack down on inappropriate onlinetargeted advertising. Aside from federal privacy laws that regulate financial
institutions and a few state laws that require certain privacy notices to
appear on websites, online-targeted advertising is largely unregulated, which
permits abuse.
Notably, self-regulation has failed to end advertising companies'
damaging practices-such as tracking online activity without full disclosure
to consumers and making opt-out procedures too difficult for the average
consumer to implement. 6 In fact, efforts of a conglomerate of advertising
companies who recently began an opt-out program have drawn little
attention. 7 The program is difficult for consumers to utilize and the program
does not apply to online-targeted advertisements that two of the largest
offenders, Google and Yahoo!, deliver.8
This article will explain online-targeted advertising and its dangers to
privacy; examine the limitations of current legislation, proposed legislation
and self-regulation; review FTC cases on spyware software to demonstrate
parallels to online-targeted advertising; and suggest a proposed federal law
and FTC regulations specifically aimed at targeted advertising.
B. Background on Targeted Advertising
1. How It Works
Online-targeted advertising occurs when companies track the Internet
activities of an individual-observing the websites visited, the time spent
viewing particular webpages and the content of emails-in order to deliver
personalized offers, advertisements and marketing materials. 9 Most

4. Id.; Dave Coustan, How Spyware Works, How STUFF WORKS, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/spyware.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
5. See Letter from Jeff Chester, Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy, and Ed
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. PIRG, to Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, Supplemental Statement in Support of Complaint and Request for
Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Online Marketing Practices (Nov.
1, 2007), at 1-2, available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCsupplemental
_statement1 107.pdf.
6. See infra Part III.D.
7. Kate Kaye, States Could Target Behavioral Sector as Industry Battles for SelfRegulation, CLICKZ, Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.clickz.com/show Page.html?page = 3627501.

8. Id.
9.

New Ways to Target Your Customer, EMARKETER, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.emarketer

.com/Article.aspx?id= 1003937.
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marketing companies monitor a user's online activities secretly, although
privacy policies and user agreements may alert users to the tracking.' 0
Marketers choose individualized advertisements for a user based on a
variety of perceived characteristics, including the user's age, location,
purchase history, contact list and web usage."
However, "[t]he data
collected extends beyond information about consumers' views of the
product to information about the consumers themselves, often including
lifestyle details and even a full-scale psychological profile."' 2 Targeted
advertising lowers advertising costs by helping a company send its
advertisements to a smaller, more selective
audience that is more likely to
3
purchase its product or utilize its services.'
Targeted advertising is not new, and has long been used in other media
forms, such as television, postal mail, radio, and magazines.14 But targeted
advertising that takes place online is more privacy invasive than in older
media forms because it offers marketers much more knowledge about the
consumer.' 5 The "interactive and dynamic tools that the Internet adds" to
targeted advertisements has changed the practice.' 6 For example, Google
picks what "ads to show people based on the context of what they are
searching for or typing about (in Gmail) at that very moment."' 7 The ability
of the online companies to instantly know exactly what people are doing
while they are viewing the ads makes online targeting advertising more
manipulative than offline targeted advertising.
Proponents of online-targeted advertising argue that it "directly
subsidizes forums for more content, services, and information."', 8 They also
10. See Louise Story, A Push to Limit the Tracking of Web Surfers' Clicks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/business/media/20adco.html?scp= 1&sq=push%201imit%20tr
acking%20web%2Osurfers&st-cse. See also infra Part II.A.
11. New Ways to Target Your Customer, EMARKETER, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.emarketer
.com/Article.aspx?id= 003937.
12. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 17 (New York University Press 2004).
13. New Ways to Target Your Customer, EMARKETER, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.emarketer
.com/Article.aspx?id= 1003937.
14. For example, commercials for toys air during children's programming.
15. Louise Story, F.T.C. To Review Online Ads and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/0 1/technology/ 01Privacy.htmlref-technology.
16. New
Ways to Target Your
Customer, EMARKETER,
Apr.
20, 2006,
http://www.emarketer.com/ Article.aspx?id=1003937 (emphasis added).
17. Louise Story, Consumer Advocates Seek a 'Do-Not-Track' List, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/technology/31cnd-privacy.html?-r=l &
page wanted%20=print.
18. Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative, to
Federal Trade Commission, Re: Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) Written Comments for the
FTC's Ehavioral Advertising Town Hall Forum (Oct. 19, 2007), at 6, availableat http://ftc.gov/os/
comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf.
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argue that consumers enjoy the personalized offers, which benefit
consumers by alerting them to good deals, aiding in comparison shopping,
and helping them find items that they already want.1 9
2.

Huge Growth in the Past Year and Impact of Media Consolidation

Online-targeted marketing is a rapidly growing industry. In 2003,
advertisers spent approximately $285 million on targeted-online
advertising. 20 That number jumped to $1.5 billion in 2007 and was expected
to rise to $2 billion in 2008.21
All of the major Internet search engine companies purchased online
As a result, searching companies and
advertising firms in 2007.22
advertising companies can combine data to create vast knowledge of
consumers in order to deliver more accurate targeted ads. Such mergers
raise questions about just how powerful targeted advertising can become.
Even smaller acquisitions in the past have helped web companies piece
together expansive profiles of consumers. For example, because Yahoo!
and weather.com collaborated, Yahoo! can discern a user's hometown and
travel plans, based on her weather searches and then deliver targeted
advertising through Yahoo! 's numerous online channels. 23
C. Comparing and Contrasting Spyware to Targeted Advertising
1. How is Spyware Similar to Targeted Advertising?
The companies that use online-targeted advertising utilize similar tactics
as the ones used in spyware software. First, they use similar technology.
Both types of companies watch private Internet activity using web beacons,
cookies, and other invisible tracking technology to follow Internet users
while they go from website to website.24 Second, both types of companies

19. Id.
Ways to Target Your Customer,
20. New
http://www.emarketer.com/ Article.aspx?id= 1003937.
21. Id.

EMARKETER,

Apr.

20,

2006,

22. Google purchased DoubleClick, an online ad serving and ad exchange provider;
Microsoft purchased Aquantive, an ad serving firm, and AdECN, an ad exchange; AOL purchased
Tacoda, a behavioral targeting firm; Yahoo! purchased RightMedia, an online ad auction network,
and BlueLithium, an online advertising network. Elinor Mills, Google Gets Even More Ambitious,
CNET NEWS, Dec. 28, 2007, http://news.cnet.comlYear-in-review-Google-gets-even-moreambitious/ 2009-1024_3-6223832.html. See also Louise Story, F.T.C. Member Vows Tighter
available at
TIMES,
Nov.
2, 2007,
N.Y.
Controls of Online Ads,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/ technology/02adco.html?_r-1 &oref=slogin.
23. Yahoo! Media Relations, Yahoo! and Weather.Com Forge Multi-National Agreement to
Provide Enhanced Weather Reports (Jan. 7, 2002), http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release908.html.
24.

Dave

Coustan,

How

Spyware

Works,

How

STUFF

WORKS,

http://computer.

howstuffworks.com/spyware.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); Louise Story, A Push to Limit the
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use the information they gather in similar ways. Without a user's "informed
consent," the companies base the ads on what they learn by watching.
Third, both types of companies produce similar harms. They steer
consumers to take a particular action, such as buy a product or visit a
different website.
Finally, both spyware and targeted ads diminish autonomy, a core
American value. Professor Daniel J. Solove points out the importance of
consumers feeling free to receive information anonymously, not just share
it. 25 In the context of using the Internet, Professor Julie Cohen writes: "The
freedom to read anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and
choice of reading materials just as expressive of identity, as the decision to
use or withhold one's own name. 2 6 Allowing unregulated targeted
advertising and spyware raises the risk of citizens fearing the ramifications
of Internet usage-and making different choices as a result-to avoid
mischaracterizations. Much of the spying and tracking occurs without
actual notice, but as consumers' knowledge increases, the anonymity
problem will worsen. As it stands now, targeted ads can be highly
manipulative, causing consumers to lose autonomy because of the ad
companies' creation of psychological profiles based on the companies'
perceived notions of the user's interest, rather than the user's own choices.
2.

How Does Spyware Differ From Targeted Advertising?

Although the companies that use online-targeted advertising use some
of the same behind-the-scenes tactics as spyware, there are several critical
differences. First, at its worst, spyware uses more invasive tactics than
online-targeted advertising. In the most egregious cases, the spyware
software changes settings on personal computers (such as "favorite lists" in
web browsers), forces consumers to visit websites or secretly installs
software that slows down a user's computer.2 7 With targeted advertising, on
the other hand, the consumer is less likely to know he is being watched
because the only activity that takes place is the appearance of
advertisements that may or may not be accurately personalized. 28 Moreover,
Tracking of Web Surfers' Clicks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, availableat http://www.nytimes.com

/2008/03/20/business/media/20adco.html?scp =1 &sq=push%201imit%20tracking%20web%20surfe
rs&st-cse.
25. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 117 (Solove addresses government and private sector
collection of information and the inadequate controls on privacy).
26. Julie E. Cohen, The Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "'Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, 1012 (1996).
27. Dave Coustan, How Spyware Works, How STUFF WORKS, http://computer.

howstuffworks.com/spyware.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
28. As consumers become increasingly aware of online tracking, the anonymity problem will
deepen because consumers will realize that all companies are tracking them.
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in targeted advertising, the user must take the affirmative step to click on a
targeted advertisement. In contrast, in spyware, the computer programming
forces the user to view certain information, without active user participation.
Both technologies cause different harms. The most egregious harms
caused by spyware involve tangible harms such as taking physical control of
a user's computer. The harms of targeted ads are not as physically invasive,
so in that sense the harms are more subtle.29
Finally, one of the biggest differences between spyware and onlinetargeted advertising is the ability of the user to more easily remove spyware,
compared to the difficultly of stopping targeted advertising. First, numerous
companies offer free anti-spyware programs. 30 This protection is not
foolproof, but at least it provides some help in stark contrast to the lack of
such programs to prevent targeted advertising. Secondly, it is easier to stop
spyware than to stop targeted advertising because users can change the
browser settings on their computers to block
spyware, but such options are
31
usually not available for online tracking.
II. The Threats of Unregulated Online-Targeted Advertising
The privacy harms of unregulated online-targeted advertising are not
entirely clear due to the novelty of the practice. In comparison, spyware
presents much more tangible and obvious harms because the practice
involves the physical taking over of personal computers.
Professor Daniel J. Solove explains that much of the harm caused by
unregulated actions that erode privacy, such as online-targeted advertising,
are a "slow series of relatively minor acts which gradually begin to add
up."l32 Solove compares the harms of unregulated privacy problems to
environmental harms, which numerous actors cause, each doing a series of
small acts that cause serious damage as a whole.33 The numerous harms that
unregulated targeted ads cause include consumers making uninformed
choices about how much information to share, corporations manipulating
behavior, and marketers deepening the economic divide by treating

29. See discussion infra Part I.B.I.
30. Such companies include Spybot (http://www.safer-networking.org/en/index.html) and
Ad-Aware (http://www.lavasoftusa.com/).
31. According to an article written for consumers, one method of stopping Spyware is to
disable Active-X on the browser if you are using the current Microsoft Windows operating system.
However, doing so can "disallow the legitimate uses for Active-X, which may interfere with the
functionality of some Web sites." Dave Coustan, How Spyware Works, How STUFF WORKS,
http://computer. howstuffworks.com/spyware.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
32. Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 769 (2007).

33.

Id.

376
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individuals differently based on socioeconomics. This paper discusses these
harms in detail below.
A. Consumers Make Uninformed Choices
Privacy experts warn that consumers make uninformed choices about
how much personal information to share, and whether to opt out of targeted
advertising.34 For example, they point out that most consumers accept
default privacy settings-on both web browsers and web sites-which
highlights the need for regulation.3 5 In accepting default privacy terms, the
consumers consent to tracking for online-targeted advertising, but the
question is whether such passive consent should be deemed meaningful
consent.
Privacy experts warn that small bits of seemingly innocuous information
can slowly come together to paint a more detailed picture about a user's
online activity than the user ever intended to share.36 Perhaps consumers are
accepting default privacy policies because they lack knowledge about the
risks of sharing too much personal information online.37
Likewise, before federal regulators took action, consumers were making
uninformed choices about spyware. Consumers were being tricked into
downloading spyware just as consumers are being tricked into accepting
online-targeted ads. Companies buried important disclosures in hard-toread user agreements and consumers were largely ignorant of the extent to
which the companies were using their personal information.
Marketing companies in favor of online tracking argue that the nature of
the Internet has led to "more consumer privacy safeguards . . . than any
other marketing channel. 3 8 Still, there is inadequate protection. Although

34. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
35. Paul M. Schwartz, Property,Privacy and PersonalData, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2081
(2004) ("Behavioral economics scholarship has demonstrated that consumers' general inertia
toward default terms is a strong and pervasive limitation on free choice.").
36. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: InformationalPrivacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1398-99 (May 2000). Cohen argues that data processors do not want to share
exactly how personal information is being used because some of the uses are so offensive that
most consumers would likely object. For example, personal information can be used for
"employment decisions and classifications by health insurance providers that exclude or
disadvantage genetic or medical 'have-nots,' employment or housing decisions based on perceived
personality risks; and employment or housing decisions based on sexual or religious preferences."
Id. at 1399.
37. Id. at 1432.
38. Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative, to
Federal Trade Commission, Re: Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) Written Comments for the
FTC's Ehavioral Advertising Town Hall Forum (Oct. 19, 2007), at 10, available at
http://ftc.gov/os/ comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf.
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consumers can stop some of the tracking by utilizing various anti-tracking
programs, such programs are not highly effective.39
Companies can disclose privacy policies in greater detail online than
offline, making it easier to inform consumers about the use of personal
information and help them make informed choices. Marketers point out this
is one reason that privacy proponents are too worried about online
tracking. 40 Even so, consumers face difficulty discovering the full extent of
the tracking to which they are being subjected, even with the privacy
policies available on virtually every website.41
The sheer multitude of privacy policies governing consumers' Internet
activities makes it hard to stay informed; search engines, news outlets,
online stores, email services, and music download sites each have their own
privacy policies. Even when notice is available, consumers face increasing
difficulty understanding the numerous polices that apply. Consumers who
read USA Today online, for example, will be subject to USA Today's online
privacy policy, which includes a list of over two dozen third-party
companies that may track the consumer in various ways when a user clicks
on an advertisement from the USA Today website.42 However, once the user
goes to the third-party websites, different privacy policies apply.
Current privacy policies of some of the largest websites that track online
activity to create targeted ads include loopholes that permit abuse and lead
consumers to misunderstand the policies. The PayPal privacy policy, for
example, has a catch-all clause stating that additional information may be
collected "from or about you in other ways not specifically described
here. 43 DoubleClick, one of the largest online advertising firms that engage
in online-targeted advertising, states that it can change its privacy policy at
any time.44
The average consumer may not be able to understand all of the privacy
implications set forth in a privacy policy due to the way companies phrase
information to make it seem more palatable. For example, the online store

39. See discussion, infra Part III.D.
40. Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative, to
Federal Trade Commission, Re: Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) Written Comments for the
FTC's Behavioral Advertising Town Hall Forum (Oct. 19, 2007), at 10, available at
http://ftc.gov/os/ comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf.
41. Cohen, supra note 36, at 1397 (noting that consumers face "enormous difficulty"
determining how personal information is being used).
42. USATODAY.com, Third-Party Advertisers and Ad Servers (Dec. 18, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/marketing/advertiser-list.htm.
43. PayPal.com, Privacy Policy for PayPal Services (including PayPal Money Market Fund),
https://www.paypal.com/privacy (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
44. DoubleClick.com, Privacy Policy for Information Use at this Website (Aug. 14. 2008),
http://www.doubleclick.com/privacy/.
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for Apple computers writes appealing language in its policy on third-party
information sharing: "There are also times when it may be advantageous for
Apple to make certain personal information about you available to
companies that Apple has a strategic relationship with ....
Finally, consumers are not in a position to bargain for more privacy
because online-targeted advertising usually arises under boilerplate user
contracts. If a person does not consent to Google's policy of online
tracking, she has little recourse except to use an inferior search engine. As
Professor Julie Cohen points out, the problem is the fact that vendors decide
what the choices about the usage of personal information will be, not the
consumers. 46 Consumers may decide to freely share private information
because they assume, correctly so, that the transaction is non-negotiable. 47
B. Power Imbalance by Ad Companies Who Use Information to Manipulate
Behavior
The growing power imbalance between companies and consumers
stems from the sheer volume of information that companies collect for
marketing purposes. Consider an introduction to a report for potential
marketers about online-targeted advertising: "Users reveal their interests by
the keywords they enter-that's the secret behind search advertising's great
success. For the first time, marketers have some idea of 'what's going on' in
48
the mind of the consumer at the moment of contact (emphasis added).
Such intimate knowledge of the consumer is just what privacy experts fear.
Professor Paul Schwartz predicts that if personal information can be freely
social
shared, people will "decline to engage in a range of different
49
information.
personal
of
use
about
concerns
to
due
interactions
Furthermore, privacy advocates, including the Center for Digital
Democracy and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, argue that
characterizing consumers with "often-flippant taxonomy"-such as
Shopaholics, Penny Pinchers, Lonely Hearts, and Hardcore Gainers- 50
"masks the crass, manipulative nature of such digital stereotyping.,

45. Apple.com, Apple Customer Privacy Policy, http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2008).
46. Cohen, supra note 36, at 1397.
47. Id.
Apr. 2006,
48. Online Ad Targeting: Engaging The Audience, EMARKETER,
http://www.emarketer.com/Report.aspx?code--targeting-may06&src=report-summary-reportsell.
49. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 2089.
50. Letter from Jeff Chester, Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy, and Ed
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. PIRG, to Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, Supplemental Statement in Support of Complaint and Request for
Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Online Marketing Practices (Nov.
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Marketers in favor of online-targeted advertising argue that allowing more
profiling will lead to better products offered and will provide consumers
with information they already want.5' However, Professor Julie Cohen
counters that such practices constitute manipulation because advertising
does not simply reflect "pre-existing desires. 52 Even benign discrimination
categorizes people as they may not wish. 53 "The view of human nature
reinforced by data-processing algorithms," Cohen asserts, "is both
unforgiving and ungenerous., 54 Moreover, it leaves little room for "second
chances. 5
Marketing companies also provide overly tempting offers based on
intimate knowledge of their consumers. For example, sub-prime mortgage
loan practices demonstrate a marketer's ability to piece together customer
information, such as her domicile, homeownership status, and income level,
56
in order to send offers to purchase homes that could be beyond her means.
While such targeting takes place off the Internet, it can be much more
manipulative when it happens online because of the marketer's precise
knowledge about the consumer based on a psychological profile and current
online activities, which enables the marketer to formulate a carefully-crafted
ad that increases susceptibility to the offer.57
The power imbalance raises concerns about diminishment of autonomy.
If online Internet tracking continues without regulation, some privacy
experts predict that the experience of being constantly watched will
"constrain, ex ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior" and will
incline people's choices toward the "bland and the mainstream., 58 Personal
autonomy requires "a zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and
interference . . . ,59 Regulating targeted advertisers will help to ensure that
using the Internet does not subject consumers to constant outside inspection.

1, 2007), at 3, available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCsupplemental-statement
1107.pdf.
51. Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative, to
Federal Trade Commission, Re: Network Advertising Initiative (NAI)Written Comments for the
FTC's Behavioral Advertising Town Hall Forum (Oct. 19, 2007), at 6, available at
http://ftc.gov/os/ comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf.
52. Cohen, supra note 36, at 1407.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1408.
55. Id.
56. This example is a hypothetical scenario that demonstrates potential dangers of onlinetargeted advertising.
57. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
58. Cohen, supra note 36, at 1426.
59. Id. at 1424.
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C. "Distributive Justice" Concerns
Targeted-online marketing presents the problem of "distributive
justice." Those in higher and lower income brackets experience harm in
different ways, but both groups suffer.
People in higher income brackets suffer because their data generates the
most useful data for marketers, meaning the data processors will more
aggressively seek their information, and users will have to go to greater
lengths to protect their privacy online. On the other hand, people in lower
income brackets are not included when marketing companies offer those in
the higher income brackets special deals on a variety of items-from
medicine to clothing to food. For example, people who are deemed to have
more money may receive online advertising for breakthrough drugs and
treatments for serious medical conditions, while those with less money to
pay for such services will not receive the ads.
Cohen points out the harms in rigid categorization of people.6 °
Although Cohen admits that the categorization will sometimes be fair, she
says a society that relies on such categories "as a means of allocating
economic opportunity" should be the subject of debate in the U.S. in order
to determine if the government should limit the sharing of personal
information.6 1
D. Concerns About Young People's Privacy
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA")
prohibits the online collection and use of personal information for children
ages thirteen and younger.
However, some commentators question if
regulators enforce the law aggressively enough with regards to onlinetargeted ads,63 and have asked for COPPA explicitly to ban targeted
advertising for children. 64 One possible consequence of allowing targeted
ads for children is increasing the childhood obesity epidemic because of
tempting targeted ads for junk food sent to children online.
Another drawback of the law is that children over age thirteen receive
no protection, and the teen-age bracket is one of the most vulnerable
because teens are less likely than adults to understand the long-term

60. Id. at 1408.
61. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506.
63. Letter from Jeffrey Chester, Center for Digital Democracy, and Ed Mierswinski,
USPIRG, to Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Calling for Action on
Behavioral Targeting (Nov. 12, 2007), available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/news-room
/letters/Letter reBehavioralTargeting.
64.

Stefanie Olsen, Group Callsfor Teen Privacy Protectionson Facebook, MySpace, CNET

NEWS, Apr. 10, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9915769-7.html?tag=nefd.top.
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consequences of sharing personal information online for tracking.65 Teens
are also more susceptible to targeted advertisements that are tailored to their
psychological weaknesses.66
E. Health Issues

Concerns about online-targeted advertising are especially heightened
when it comes to pharmaceutical ads. Advertisements about highly
sensitive health problems that are delivered to Internet users after marketers
determine the users have a particular illness based on their Internet activity
are especially egregious.
Drug companies who use online-targeted
advertising may have enough intimate information about a consumer to be
able to give tempting offers for drugs that may not be in the consumer's best
interest. Recently, several industry members voluntarily decided to restrict
usage of targeted advertising because of such concerns. 67
Most
industrialized countries other than the U.S. prohibit targeted consumer ads
for drugs.68
F. Monopoly Profits by Large Companies

Large corporations can spend more money on online-targeted
advertising than smaller companies, which raises the risk of monopolization.
Although marketing analysts stress that targeted advertisements deliver
more sales for a lower cost, the price for such advertising remains high
when compared to traditional Internet advertisements 69 so large companies
can more easily afford the advertisements.
G. Misplaced and Misused Private Data

The massive amount of data collected for online-targeted advertising
may be misplaced and misused. Few systems exist to ensure the data stays
out of the wrong hands. "In other words, the problem is not simply a lack of
individual control over information, but a situation where nobody is
exercising meaningful control over the information. 7 ° Executives of

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Peter Loftus, Drug Companies Trim Advertising Spending, Tweak Approach, Dow JONES
NEWSWIRES, Dec. 9, 2008, available at http://english.capital.gr/NewsPrint.asp?id=635012.
68. Direct-to-consumer advertising in the United States, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.
sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Direct-to-consumer-advertising-in-the-United-States
(last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
69. See Scott Buresh, The Evolution of Online Advertising Technology - More Targeting,
Less Privacy (Part One), MEDIUM BLUE, http://www.mediumblue.com/newsletters/advertisingtechnology.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
70. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 53.
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corporations will often wait for external forces to act, i.e., government
regulators, before improving data collection practices. 7'
Moreover, companies may use information for a different purpose than
that which consumers intended, especially when companies sell the
information for secondary uses without consumer consent. Finally, third
parties may gain unauthorized access to stored information because
companies do not operate under standardized procedures for keeping the
information secure.
III. The Limitations of Current Legislation, Self-Regulation, and
Proposed Legislation
A. Gray Area of Privacy Law and Cyberspace Law

Online-targeted advertising is not explicitly regulated, and no federal or
state cases speak to the matter yet, which means that consumers enjoy little
legal protection against damaging practices. Attempts at self-regulation,
while laudable, are deeply flawed. As such, the practice of online-targeted
advertising represents a gray area of the law.
Under federal law, deceptive trade practices of any kind violate the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 72
Additionally, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act makes it unlawful for companies to gain
unauthorized access to customers' stored e-mails while they are in transit to
the recipient.7 3 Portions of such laws could be used to regulate onlinetargeted advertising, but do not directly address it.
In contrast, federal laws and a few state laws specifically regulate
spyware. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act banned unauthorized
installation of spyware at the federal level.74 The state of Utah banned
spyware in the Spyware Control Act 75 and California banned spyware in the
Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act.76
The following section will discuss federal laws, state laws, and
proposed self-regulation efforts that relate to online-targeted advertising and
explain the benefits and pitfalls of each.

71.

Id. (quoting H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND

CORPORATE AMERICA 162 (University of North Carolina Press 1994)).
72. 15 U.S.C.S. § 45(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (LexisNexis 2008).
74. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030 (LexisNexis 2008).
75. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 - 13-40-302 (2008).
76. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22947.2 (Deering 2008).
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B. Federal Laws
No federal laws specifically cover online-targeted advertising, but at
least two laws restrict financial institutions' use of personal information.
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, financial institutions must give
customers privacy notices that explain collection and sharing practices, and
companies must allow customers to limit information sharing.77 The
drawback to this law is that it only applies to financial institutions, and
targeted advertising takes place in many other sectors of the economy.78
Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the federal government established
fair practices for the use of personal information relating to a consumer's
credit report. 79 This includes rights of data quality, the right to access and
correct data, security of data, use limitations on data, and requirements for
destroying data. 80 The law addresses many of the areas of concern raised by
online-targeted advertising, including data security, but it does not apply to
most online-targeted advertising because it covers only credit reports. The
law, however, provides a valuable framework for how the federal
government should limit the use of personal information to the purpose for
which it is collected.
C. State Laws
California and New York both have very strong consumer privacy
protection laws in place. In California, the Online Privacy Protection Act of
2003 requires online services collecting personal information about
California residents through a commercial web site to conspicuously post a
privacy policy and comply with it.81 The law requires only disclosure; it
does not regulate the content of privacy policies or require companies to
draft precise, understandable policies. A prime result is PayPal's privacy
policy, discussed above, which states that PayPal "may collect additional
information from or about you in other ways not specifically described
here. 82 The company posts this policy in a conspicuous place, thus it
complies with the law. But PayPal's policy illustrates that the law merely

77. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6801-6809 (LexisNexis 2008).
78. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6805 (LexisNexis 2008).
79. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (LexisNexis 2008).
80. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681s-2 (requiring furnishers of information to consumer reporting
agencies to provide accurate information and to notify consumers when negative information is
shared with a third party); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681i (explaining procedures in case of disputed
accuracy); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681w (requiring proper disposal of information); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681b
(requiring limited use of information collected).
81. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579 (Deering 2008).
82. PayPal.com, Privacy Policy for PayPal Services (including PayPal Money Market Fund),
https://www.paypal.com/privacy (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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requires disclosure about the myriad ways companies can use and share
personal information, but does not demand privacy protection.
New York's Internet Security Privacy Act and its Model Policy provide
strong online privacy protection, but they apply only to state agencies.83
The Model Policy provides robust privacy protections for users of
government websites, but private websites need not comply. 84 Under the
Model Policy, government agencies must provide users with specific
information about data collection and use.85 Moreover, the language is
clearer than in typical privacy policies, thus easier to understand.86 Finally,
the Model Policy requires that sites explain the particular technology that is
87
tracking Internet activity.
In conclusion, California's privacy law is too vague to provide
substantial protection because it only requires disclosure of policies-which
may be flawed-and permits companies to engage in extensive privacyeroding tracking practices. New York's privacy law, on the other hand,
provides a Model Policy that provides extensive consumer protection, but its
application is limited to government agencies' websites.
D. Self-Regulation
Three main self-regulation efforts include the Network Advertising
Initiative ("NAI") (a consortium that administers an opt-out program), P3P
(an organization that plans to set international standards for opt-out and
disclosure procedures) and TRUSTe (a private auditing service).88 The
failure of these three initiatives demonstrates the need for federal legislation.
The NAI, a consortium of online advertising companies, allows
consumers to opt-out of targeted advertising that come from NAI
members.8 9 Consumers may complete a form on the NAI website indicating
which advertising companies may not track them. 90 Consumers must access
this form from the web browser on his or her personal computer. Under this

83.

N.Y. Tech. Law §§ 201- 208 (McKinney's 2008).

84.

JAMES T. DILLON, NEW YORK STATE BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINE, GUIDELINES FOR

INTERNET PRIVACY POLICIES, Part 1 (2002), http://www.oft.state.ny.us/policy/NYSGuidelineG02001.htm.
85. Id. at Part 2.
86. At least one study has found that "people with a high school education can easily
understand only 1 percent of the privacy policies of large companies." Louise Story, F.T.C.
Member Vows Tighter Controls of Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/technology/02adco.html?_r=l &oref=slogin.
87. Id. at Part 4.6.
88. See infra notes 89, 94-95.
89. Network Advertising Initiative, http://networkadvertising.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
90. Network
Advertising
Initiative,
Opt
Out
of
Behavorial
Advertising,
http://networkadvertising.org/managing/opt-out.asp (last visited April 4, 2009).
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small businesses can continue to use targeted advertising

"affordably, efficiently, and effectively" so long as they comply with
consumers' opt-out choices. 9 1 The problem with the NAI is that a user must
revisit the NAI website to update her opt-out choices if she purchases a new
computer, uses a different computer, deletes opt-out cookies, or changes
settings on her computer.92 Finally, although NAI's membership is
growing, not all targeted advertisers have joined the consortium, limiting its
effectiveness.93
Another effort at self-regulation is the Platform for Privacy Preferences,
known as P3P, which would enable websites to disclose their practices in "a
standard format that can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by
user agents. 94 Under this framework, the user would choose which
websites could track her based on each website's privacy policy, which the
web browser would check against the privacy preferences that the user had
preset in her web browser. The user would have to approve any transaction
that contradicted her preset privacy preferences. If implemented well, this
program would allow consumers to make highly individualized, transactionby-transaction choices about sharing private information, rather than a takeit-or-leave-it approach to entire websites. P3P backers have been trying to
launch the program since the 1990s, but have run into logistical roadblocks.
If implemented, P3P may be difficult for the average consumer to
implement because it would require consumers to spend time managing
their privacy preferences. Also, websites are not obliged to participate,
meaning the websites would not have to allow the preset privacy
preferences to be followed.
The final self-regulation effort is the use of a private company,
TRUSTe, to provide "seals of approval" on websites that indicate the level
of privacy protection being offered. 95 TRUSTe acts as an auditor, reviewing
the company's privacy policies to ensure each company is following the
91. Letter from J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative, to
Federal Trade Commission, Re: Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) Written Comments for the
FTC's Ehavioral Advertising Town Hall Forum (Oct. 19, 2007), at 7, availableat http://ftc.gov/os/
comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf.
92. Network Advertising Initiative, FAQs, http://networkadvertising.org/managing/faqs.asp
(last visited April, 4, 2009).
93. The two largest companies using targeted advertising, Google and Microsoft, are not
currently NAI members, but recently submitted applications. Kate Kaye, States Could Target
Behavioral Sector as Industry Battles for Self-Regulation, CLICKZ, Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.
clickz.com/show Page.htnl?page= 3627501.
94. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, What is P3P?, http://www.w3.org/P3P/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
95. TRUSTe.com, Who's On the List, http://www.truste.org/about/member list.php (last
visited Apr. 14, 2008) (listing hundreds of TRUSTe's customers, including most of the householdname websites, such as eBay, Microsoft, and Yahoo!).
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privacy standards to which it agreed. 96 It also provides a dispute resolution
service for consumers.97 A major advantage of the program is its
widespread adoption, which shows that both companies and consumers give
it some degree of credence. 98 Several of the largest websites use TRUSTe,
including eBay, Microsoft, AOL and Yahoo!. 99 However, the program
provides few consequences for breaches of privacy policies, and consumers
may not notice if the TRUSTe seal of approval is temporarily removed from
the website due to a breach. 0 0 Moreover, like California's online privacy
law, the TRUSTe self-auditing system requires compliance only with the
privacy policies that each company establishes for itself.
E. Proposed "Do Not Track" Federal Legislation
Various privacy experts have proposed a "do not track" registry akin to
the current "do not call registry. '' 01 However, this could cause more
privacy problems than it fixes. The proposal, suggested by the Center for
Digital Democracy and 10 advocacy groups, calls for a national database of
consumers who have requested removal from online tracking. 10 2 The web
browsers would be responsible for blocking or deleting "persistent unique
identifiers" such as cookies in order to block ad companies' access to
03
consumers who had opted out.1
The "do not track" plan would be expensive and technically challenging
to implement. Because of jurisdictional issues, internationally run websites
would largely be exempt. Privacy experts fear that a "do not track" program
would allow the government to collect too much personally identifiable
information from the public, which would cause a high risk of government
misuse of the data due to unreliable "institutional structures and

96. TRUSTe.org, Privacy is Everyone's Business, http://www.truste.org/about/ourservices.php (last visited April 4, 2009).
97. Id.
98. TRUSTe.org, Who's On the List, http://www.truste.org/about/member-list.php (last
visited Apr. 14, 2008).
99. Id.
100. TRUSTe.org,
General
TRUSTe Application:
Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.truste.orgibusinesses/faq-general.php (last visited April 4, 2009).
101. Letter from Ari Schwartz, Deputy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology, et
al., to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, In advance of the FTC Town Hall,

"Ehaviroal Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology," to be held November 1-2, 2007 in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20071031
consumerprotectionsbehavioral.pdf.
102. The CDT's proposal, only a few months old, provides only a rough outline for the
registry. Operation of the Do Not Track List, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY,

http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20071031 donottrack.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
103. Id.
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architectures of power." 10 4 For the first time, the government would have an
extensive database of citizens' computer IP addresses. Furthermore, the
proposal's call for an opt-out system, rather than an opt-in system, may lead
to consumers to avoid signing up due to inertia. Consumers may have false
hopes of the program protecting them against online tracking if they enter
the registry, despite the possibility that the registry would not protect all
private information.
The registry's biggest benefit is giving consumers what they want.
Studies show that most consumers like targeted ads, 10 5 and this program
would let consumers choose to receive targeted advertisements if they like.
Nonetheless, the do-not-track proposal is not the best way to protect
consumers from online-targeted advertising because of its expense and the
risk that the government will use the extensive consumer data it collectsincluding the IP addresses of citizens-to further track individuals for its
own purposes, such as surveillance.
IV. FTC Actions Against Spyware Activities
A. Spyware Problems

From 2005 to 2007, the FTC filed numerous complaints and settled with
various companies for improper use of spyware to track and control online
activity. ° 6 However, the FTC has not taken a single action to prohibit
online-targeted advertising, despite numerous complaints by public
advocacy groups. 107
The FTC's aggressive campaign against spyware illustrates that
spyware raises many of same legal issues-and consumer-harming
behavior-that are apparent in online-targeted advertising: inadequate
consent, buried disclosures, and difficult removal procedures. As such, the

104. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 186-87 (noting "lack of control over government information
gathering" in the past 50 years).
105. Matthew G. Nelson, Users Request More Targeted Ads, Study Says, CLICKZ, Oct. 12,
2007, http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3627288 ("While the majority of U.S. Web
users say they see too many ads, they wouldn't mind having those ads better targeted to their
needs.").
106. See infra notes 108, 113, and 115 and accompanying text.
107. Letter from Jeff Chester, Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy, and Ed
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. PIRG, to Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, Supplemental Statement in Support of Complaint and Request for
Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Online Marketing Practices (Nov.
1, 2007), at 1, available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCsupplementalstatement 1107.pdf (noting how nothing has changed since the the Center for Digital Democracy
(CDD) and the US Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG) filed a complaint with the FTC
against Microsoft and other companies for unfair and deceptive online-targeted marketing
practices in November 2006).
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FTC actions on spyware suggest that the FTC should also take action
against companies engaging in improper online-targeted advertising.
1. Lack of Meaningful Consent or No Consent

Several FTC spyware cases questioned whether consumers had
consented to installing spyware and, specifically, whether consumers had
provided meaningful consent.
In a complaint filed against Sony BMG Music Entertainment in 2007,
the FTC stated that Sony failed to adequately disclose its tracking
practices. 10 8 When the user connected to the Internet, the media player that
Sony sold as a bundle with its CDs automatically connected to Sony,
showing Sony the album being played, which Sony used to generate
promotional materials for the user.10 9 However, Sony did not provide notice
of this practice on the jewel case holding the CD.110 Furthermore, after
purchasing the CD, Sony required the user to accept the user agreement, or
the computer would eject the CD.111 Finally, even if the consumer rejected
1 12
the agreement, some of the tracking software remained on the computer.'
Sony's practices raised problems that online-targeted advertising
presents today. Users have little control over how a company uses personal
information because of one-sided, boilerplate user agreements that must be
accepted in order to access a website. Moreover, user contracts do not
always make it clear that agreeing to the contract means the consumer has
consented to extensive tracking. Finally, in some cases, companies collect
information before a user has a chance to reject a user agreement that
outlines the usage of personal information.
2.

BuriedPolicies and Disclosures

In the FTC case In the Matter of Advertising.corn, the FTC stipulated
that spyware that watched or controlled Internet activities without the
consumers' prior knowledge because policies on such activities were buried
in the End User License Agreements ("EULAs") constituted deceptive
practices. 13 In the case, the FTC noted disfavorably that the disclosure
stating that information could be shared with third parties in exchange for

108.
3019

Complaint at 4, In the Matter of Sony BMG Music Entertainment, FTC File No. 062(June

28,

2007),

available

at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/0623019

cmp070629.pdf.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112.

Id.

113. Complaint at 2-3, In the Matter of Advertising.com, FTC File No. 042-3196 (Sept. 12,
2005), available at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423196/050803comp0423196.pdf.
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and located under
the consumers' use of the software was in small 1print
14
several other hyperlinks, which made it hard to find.
In another case, the FTC took issue with a spyware program that
Odysseus Marketing installed on personal computers without providing
conspicuous disclosures.115 When users downloaded the software, the only
notice that Odysseus could share a user's personal information with third
parties appeared in the middle of a two-page EULA.'16 Moreover, Odysseus
did not require users to read the EULA in order to accept it (they only had to
check a box stating they had accepted it) and Odysseus did not adequately
disclose the consequences
of signing the EULA through the labeling of the
117
hyperlink to the EULA.
The FTC does not tolerate buried disclosures regarding companies'
policies on tracking Internet activity and sharing information with third
parties. 118 In similar fashion, companies bury their disclosures about onlinetargeted advertising. For example, Yahoo! shares its privacy policy in
detail, and provides links to the specific privacy policies that apply to the
dozens of services that Yahoo! operates.1 1 9 Nonetheless, in the midst of all
of the details, it includes buried disclosures. For example, halfway through
one of the numerous privacy policies, Yahoo! notes:
Yahoo! "targets" some ads to users that may fit a certain
profile-for example, men interested in financial services.
Yahoo! does not provide any personal information to the
advertiser when you interact with or view a targeted
advertisement. However, when you view or interact with an ad
the possibility exists that the advertiserwill make the assumption
0
that you meet the targetingcriteriaused to display the ad.12

114. Id. at 2.
115. Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3, FTC v. Odysseus Marketing,
available
at
No.
1:05-cv-00330-SM
(D.
N.H.
Sept.
21,
2005),

www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423205/050929comp0423205.pdf.
116. Id. at6.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 11 (noting that "failure to disclose these facts, in light of the representation made,
constitutes a deceptive act or practice .... ); Complaint at 5, In the Matter of Advertising.com,
FTC File No. 042-3196 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423196
/050803comp0423196.pdf.
119. Yahoo! Privacy, What This Privacy Policy Covers, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us
/yahoo (last visited April 4, 2009).
on
Yahoo!,
Third
Party
and
Affiliate
Cookies
120. Yahoo!
Privacy,
(last visited Apr. 4, 2009)
http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/thirdparties/details.html
(emphasis added).
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This example shows that disclosures, even lengthy ones, can fail to
specify the company's actual use of private information. Yahoo!'s policy
also notes that it frequently acquires other companies, but that users must
refer to the policies of the acquired companies. 121 This web of information,
with disclosures buried within disclosures, highlights the same issue that the
FTC addressed in the Advertising.com and Odysseus Marketing complaints,
and shows the need for the FTC to take action against online-targeted
advertising.
3. No Notice

In one of the most egregious FTC cases that addressed spyware, FTC v.
Odysseus Marketing, consumers had no notice--constructive or actualabout a subset of the spyware software that Odysseus installed on their
personal computers.1 22 Lack of notice is unlikely to be a problem today
because virtually all companies provide privacy notices.
4.

Difficult Removal Procedures

The FTC has taken issue with difficult removal procedures for spyware
once installed. The U.S. District Court for the Central District ordered
Digital Enterprises to include an "uninstall" program for all individuals who
had agreed to have spyware programs on their computers and to ensure the
uninstall program was easy to locate on the user's computer.) 23 The court
also ordered the company to provide complete terms of use, rather124than
partial terms, before the end of the download of the spyware program.
In the Sony case, the FTC took issue with the software programs
because it took more than reasonable efforts to uninstall the spyware
programs.1 25 In addition, the FTC chastised both Digital Enterprises and
DirectRevenue for adding provisions that overrode a consumer's decision to
uninstall a spyware program.126
121. Yahoo! Privacy, Yahoo! Acquired Companies, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/
acquiredcompanies (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
122. FTC v. Odysseus Marketing, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30230, at *11-12 (D. N.H. Apr. 19,
2006).
123. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Final Order For Permanent Injunction and
Monetary Relief at 10, FTC v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., No. CV06-4923 CAS (AJWx) (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623008/070905digitalenterprisesstipfnl
.pdf.
124. Id. at 7.
125. In the Matter of Sony BMG Music, at 4.
126. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 17-18, FTC v. Digital
Enterprises, Inc., et al., No. CV06-4923 CAS (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623008/060808movielandcmplt.pdf, Complaint at 6, In the Matter
of DirectRevenue LLC, FTC File No. 052-3131, (June 26, 2007), available at
http://fc.gov/os/caselist/0523131/0523131cmp070629.pdf.
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Difficult removal procedures also occur in online-targeted advertising.
Stopping online-targeted advertising poses challenges because such
programs as the NAI and TRUSTe cover only a portion of the companies
involved. For example, Yahoo! tells users that to stop tracking by thirdparty advertising companies whose ads appear on Yahoo!, the users must
individually contact the third-party advertising companies. 127 Yahoo! lists
more than 50 advertising companies to contact. 128 As in the Sony case, it
would require more than reasonable care for the average consumer to
manage the time-consuming process of doing so.
B. Why the FTC has not Pursued Targeted Advertising Companies

The FTC has never taken action against a company for online-targeted
advertising even though the practice raises many of the same legal issues
and harms as spyware use. There are several possible reasons for this.
First, online-targeted advertising is newer than spyware and has not
garnered as much public attention. The FTC has limited financial resources
for cracking down on consumer-harming behaviors, and it will most often
choose to pursue practices that are more notorious. Second, while many of
the harms that targeted advertising causes are similar to spyware, the harms
in targeted advertising tend to be subtler.12 9
Nonetheless, the FTC has recently indicated the possibility of formally
recommending a self-regulatory system for targeted ads, which is a step in
the right direction, but would not provide as much consumer protection as
this article advocates. 30 Still, the FTC's roundtable meeting about targeted
advertising in November 2007 showed its growing awareness of the privacy
issues involved. 13 1 The recent decision to take action likely reflects that
privacy advocates have been pushing
online-targeted advertising as the next
32
major privacy-in-cyberspace issue.

127. Yahoo!
Privacy,
Third
Party
and
Affiliate
Cookies
on
Yahoo!,
http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ thirdparties/details.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
128. Id.
129. See discussion supra Part I.B.
130. Federal Trade Commission Office of Public Affairs, FTC Staff Proposes Online
Behavioral Advertising Privacy Principles (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/
principles.shtm.
131. Federal Trade Commission Office of Public Affairs, FTC to Host Town Hall to Examine
Privacy
Issues
and
Online
Behavioral
Marketing
(Aug.
6.
2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/08/ehavioral.shtm.
132. Louise Story, F.T.C. To Review Online Ads and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/01/technology/ 01Privacy.htinl?refrtechnology.
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V. A New Proposed Federal Law Aimed at
Online-Targeted Advertising
A. Introduction

Numerous initiatives to address the privacy concerns related to onlinetargeted advertising, including self-regulation and a "do not track" registry,
fail to provide enough protection for consumers. 133 This article proposes
federal legislation that would make online-targeted advertising an opt-in
program that private companies would administer, but that the FTC would
ultimately oversee with the authority to levy hefty fines for non-compliance.
Under the legislation, consumers could choose how much personal
information to share, but ad companies could never track highly sensitive
personal information.
B. Proposal
1. Logistics

The FTC would oversee the practice of targeted advertising, just as the
FTC has regulated spyware, under its power to stop unfair and deceptive
trade practices. The FTC would conduct random audits of websites to
ensure companies kept track of opt-in requests accurately. In addition, the
FTC would ensure that the companies kept secure any personal information
they collect specifically for targeted marketing, in order to prevent
disclosure to unauthorized parties. 134 Finally, the law would authorize the
FTC to collect fines from websites that did not comply.
2.

Opt-in Program

The most important aspect of the legislation would mandate that all
websites and marketers engaged in online-targeted advertising have opt-in
policies for all uses of private information that they collect. Implementing
the opt-in program would not be through the government, but through the
websites and marketing companies themselves.
Under an opt-in program, the consumer could change her mind at any
point about whether to be tracked or not. Consumers would be able to
133. Letter from Jeff Chester, Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy, and Ed
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. PIRG, to Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, Supplemental Statement in Support of Complaint and Request for
Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Online Marketing Practices (Nov.
1, 2007), at 1, available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCsupplementalstatement
1107.pdf.
134. While the E.C.P.A. requires the safekeeping of personal information, this proposal would
include the explicit requirement of securing personal data that companies collect for targeted
advertising.
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disable programs that track Internet actions. When conducting private
Internet surfing, for example, the user could temporarily stop the tracking.
3.

Meaningful Notice

The federal bill would require that websites provide meaningful notice
about the practice of targeted advertising. Before opting in, the consumers
would receive full disclosure, including a complete list of possible uses of
the information-such as third-party usage-the reason for collecting the
information, and an explanation of the technology tracking the user. The
law would require it to use language that the average consumer understood.
The opt-in program with full disclosures would strike the correct
balance between speech concerns and property rights because it would allow
consumers to receive targeted advertising as long as they had real
knowledge about tracking policies. 135 It would also enable consumers to
make informed choices about which websites to trust with personal
information.
The companies would have to ensure that consent to the collection, use,
and exchange of personally identified data is informed and meaningful.
Website companies would be able to choose how best to alert people to the
notices. They could require users to read the privacy terms before clicking
"I agree" or use pop-up boxes to ask permission from the user.
4.

No Secondary Use of Information

The law would prohibit unauthorized use of information for a secondary
purpose, as opposed to the purpose for which the company collected it.
Companies could not sell personal information to another company or use
the information for a different purpose besides for the targeted
advertisements to which the consumer consented.
Under this proposal, the consumers' rights in the information would
follow personal information through "downstream transfers and [limit] the
negative 6effects that result from 'one-shot' permission on all personal data
13
trade."
5.

Time Limits

The law would set a time limit of one year during which the company
could use information about an individual, then the company would have to
135.

Cohen, supra note 36, at 1428 (addressing the need for federal legislation on privacy

policies to address first amendment speech concerns).
136. Privacy expert Paul Schwartz, who proposes "hybrid inalienability" of personal
information, in which individuals can share personal information, discusses this idea and suggests
strict limits on the future use of personal information after the initial exchange. Paul M. Schwartz,
Property,Privacy and PersonalData, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2094 (2004).
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discard it safely. 137 Discarding such information safely could mean
138
destroying it physically or erasing the information from back-up systems.
6. Exceptions
Companies could never use highly sensitive health information for
behavioral marketing in order to provide national protection and to ensure
that individuals could never make uninformed choices about sharing
potentially stigmatizing information. Minimally, companies could not direct
ads to people with serious medical conditions, if the companies gleaned
such information using online-targeted advertising.
C. Summary
A federal law would provide strong privacy protection to consumers in
an area of privacy law that has not yet been tested or challenged. It would
require companies using online tracking for targeted marketing to obtain the
meaningful consent of the consumers first.
VI. Conclusion
As this article has shown, consumers need federal regulation to address
the privacy problems that targeted advertising can cause. The rapidly
growing practice has little oversight by the FTC, and no cases have yet
tested its boundaries. As such, the practice has the potential to cause
increasingly serious privacy harms.
Although the FTC has recently taken an interest in stopping improper
online-targeted advertising by hosting roundtable meetings, it has failed to
actually pursue marketers engaging in problematic practices or establish
regulations. Thus, a federal law specifically aimed at the practice would be
the most effective means of regulating abusive practices. The FTC's
aggressive campaign against improper spyware shows that spyware poses
strikingly similar risks as online-targeted advertising: inadequate consent,
buried disclosures, and difficult removal procedures. Such anti-consumer
and privacy-eroding practices are also present in much of the targeted
advertising industry; therefore federal regulation would ensure the utmost
protection of consumer privacy in the future.

137. This rule would exclude aggregated data, which is not linked to individuals, but
marketers can utilize it.
138. Long-term collection and storage of data is a problem today, as companies collect more
data than they can use with the hopes of finding a use for it sometime in the future. Some
companies voluntarily discard personal information right away. Google, for example, searches
users' emails to deliver targeted advertising, but it does not store that particular data. Louise Story,
Consumer Advocates Seek a 'Do-Not-Track' List, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/10/31/technology/31 cnd-privacy.html?pagewanted=print.

